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a  b  s  t  r  a  c  t
Taking  the  assumptions  of the  resource  dependency  theory  as our  starting  point,  the  main  objective
of  this  investigation  is to gain  an  understanding  of  how  and  in what  way  board  members  who  serve
on  multiple  boards  (interlocks)  can  affect a  ﬁrm’s  proﬁtability,  and  whether  it is  useful  to  consider  the
derivation  of  these  interlocks  according  to the  type  of board  member  (executive  or non-executive)  who
possesses them.  Using  dynamic  panel  data  analysis  (GMM)  and  a sample  of 88 ﬁrms  quoted  on  the
Spanish  Continuous  Market  for  the  period  2005–2008,  our  results  conﬁrm  the  existence  of  a curvilinear
(inverted-U)  relation  between  interlocks  and  ﬁrm  performance.  The  results  demonstrate  that this  relation
is only signiﬁcant  if we  include  the total  number  of external  ties  rather  than just the  number  of  links
generated  by non-executive  directors.  We  can  also  conﬁrm  that  the  degree  of  familiarity  and  shared
knowledge  between  board  members  (measured  by  average  board  tenure)  affects  this  relationship.
© 2015  AEDEM.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  This  is  an  open  access  article  under  the  CC
BY-NC-ND  license  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
¿Es  útil  diferenciar  a  los  interlocks  de  acuerdo  con  el  tipo  de  consejero
(ejecutivo  o  no  ejecutivo)  que  los  posee?  Su  inﬂuencia  sobre  el  rendimiento
de  la  empresa
alabras clave:
onsejos de administración
nterlocks
ermanencia del consejo
endimiento de la empresa
r  e  s  u  m  e  n
Partiendo  de  los supuestos  de  la  teoría  de dependencia  de  recursos,  el principal  objetivo  de  esta  inves-
tigación  pasa  por conocer  cómo  y de qué  forma  la  pertenencia  de  los  consejeros  a múltiples  consejos
(interlocks)  podría  afectar  a la  rentabilidad  de  la empresa  y si  es  importante  considerar  en  esta  relación
la procedencia  de los interlocks  según  la  tipología  del  consejero  que  lo ostente  (consejeros  ejecutivos
y  no ejecutivos).  Mediante  un  análisis  de  datos  de  panel  dinámico  (GMM),  y a través  de  una  muestra
de  88 empresas  cotizadas  en  el  Mercado  Continuo  espan˜ol  para  el periodo  2005–2008,  los resultados
obtenidos  conﬁrman  que  existe  una  relación  curvilínea  (en  forma  de  U invertida)  entre  los  interlocks  y el
rendimiento  de  la  empresa,  y  que  esta relación  es sólo  signiﬁcativa  si tenemos  en  cuenta  el número  total
de  vínculos  externos,  y no sólo  cuando  tomamos  en  número  de  vínculos  generados  por  los consejeros
no-ejecutivos.  Asimismo,  podemos  aﬁrman  que  el grado  de  familiaridad  y conocimiento  mutuo  entre  los
miembros del  consejo  (medido  por  la  permanencia  media  del consejo)  inﬂuye  sobre  esta  relación.
© 2015  AEDEM.  Publicado  por  Elsevier  España,  S.L.U.  Este  es  un  artículo  Open  Access  bajo  la  licencia∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: lcalero@upo.es (L. Pérez-Calero Sánchez).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.redee.2015.04.001
019-6838/© 2015 AEDEM. Published by Elsevier España, S.L.U. This is an open acce
y-nc-nd/4.0/).CC BY-NC-ND  (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
IntroductionThe board of directors can be viewed as a source of compet-
itive advantage for an organisation, since it provides access to
valuable external resources and allows the ﬁrm to respond to
ss article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
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utside events (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Wincent, Anokhin, & Boter,
009). Studies based on the resource provision role of the board
ave generally focused on the external connections brought by
he directors; the ties to other ﬁrms created by their joint board
embership, known as interlocking directorates, are the most
ommonly used in the literature (Beckman & Haunschild, 2002;
ulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kor &
undaramurthy, 2009; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Ortiz, Aragón,
elgado, & Ferrón, 2012).
Prior studies have sought to understand how the resources
rought by board members via their interlocks affect a ﬁrm’s per-
ormance and have proposed both positive (Kim & Cannella, 2008)
nd negative (Goerzen & Beamish, 2005) relations, and reached
 variety of conclusions. These inconsistent results are due to, in
he majority of cases, the existence of different types of interlocks,
nd the different effects these have on the ﬁrms’ performance and
trategies. For example, Davis (1991) examine how a ﬁrm’s inter-
ocks formed with other companies that have adopted poison pill
trategies in the past, increasing the likelihood of the ﬁrm adopting
imilar tactics; Shipilov, Greve, and Rowley, (2010) analyse how the
doption of a practice by one organisation is positively inﬂuenced
y the accumulated adoption of the same practice by its interlock-
ng ﬁrm; and ﬁnally, Diestre, Rajagopalan, and Dutta (2014) exam-
ne how board members’ experience in a speciﬁc market increases
he likelihood of an interlocking ﬁrm entering that new market.
However, despite attempts in the literature to classify the
arious types of interlocks, the majority of studies ignore any
istinction according to origin (from executive or non-executive
irectors); they are examined implicitly, with little awareness of
he importance of the ties brought by non-executive directors
Certo, 2003; Filatotchev, 2006; Johansen & Pettersson, 2013; Kor
 Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian, Haleblian, & Rajagopalan, 2011), and
gnoring the rich potential of the links formed by executive direc-
ors. Firms need to appoint non-executive board members who  will
ring new resources and knowledge to the top management team
TMT) (Kor & Misanyi, 2008). This is not to say, however, that the
esources brought by executive directors should be ignored, espe-
ially when they also contribute new resources and knowledge
erived from their external ties, and in particular through their
nterlocks.
The composition of the board is affected by the age and sta-
ility of the ﬁrms in its sector and thus the majority of the top
anagement team of newly created ﬁrms (new ventures) tend to
e board members. As a result, in order to verify that the ﬁrm’s
ecisions are being taken in an appropriate manner, the literature
n corporate governance is beginning to question whether board
embers possess and are contributing sufﬁcient resources, and to
sk whether non-executive directors should be appointed to make
p for the possible failings of its executive directors (Dalziel, Gentry,
 Bowerman, 2011; Knockaert & Ucbasaran, 2013; Knockaert,
jornali, & Erikson, 2014). However, in established ﬁrms of a certain
ize, the literature takes for granted that it is appropriate to appoint
on-executive directors. It considers that non-executive directors
xert an important control over the management, provide support
nd advice thanks to their human capital or professional experience
many board members enjoy a high professional prestige) and are
ble to bring in resources from outside the ﬁrm through their net-
ork of contacts (Finegold, Benson, & Hecht, 2007; Kroll, Walters,
 Son, 2007). On the other hand, inﬂuenced by agency theory, the
iterature presupposes that executive directors, members of the
op management team (Dalziel et al., 2011), will pursue their own
nterests and rewards at the expense of the ﬁrm’s shareholders. This
eans that little attention has been paid to the external resources
rought by executive directors or the need to study the board as a
roup of individuals who contribute valuable and complementary
esources. Dirección y Economía de la Empresa 24 (2015) 130–137 131
We therefore consider it appropriate to examine the value that
all board members contribute through their interlocks. In this
investigation, we  propose that the resources brought by the direc-
tors, regardless of type, enable the ﬁrm to take better decisions,
thanks to their pooled knowledge and experience (Filatotchev,
2006), and that this ultimately affects ﬁrm performance.
Finally, by considering the complete set of resources brought by
all of the board members, regardless of type, we  are supporting an
idea that has already been proposed in a number of studies (Forbes
& Milliken, 1999; Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Stevenson & Radin,
2009; Van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009) that the board should be
viewed in its entirety as a “group of individuals”, whose effective-
ness depends not only on the individual resources contributed by
each member, but also on its ability to act as a team and to share and
assimilate these resources. The aim of our investigation is to pur-
sue this line of research in greater depth, introducing the moderator
effect of board tenure on the relation between interlocks and ﬁrm
performance. A board with high average board tenure encourages
better relations and greater trust between its members (Le, Kroll,
and Walters, 2013), encouraging a mutual and efﬁcient exchange
of the vision and strategic resources acquired from other ﬁrms.
By looking at board tenure therefore, we can analyse the effect of
the degree of familiarity and mutual understanding between board
members and their essential role in the assimilation and application
of the resources that can be gained through interlocks.
This work is structured as follows: in the ﬁrst section we explain
our choice of subject and set out our objectives. In the subsequent
sections we  carry out a literature review that allows us to propose
a set of hypotheses. In the ﬁnal section we  explain our empiri-
cal study, followed by an analysis and interpretation of the results
obtained.
Literature review and proposed hypotheses
The more traditional literature, based on agency theory (Fama
& Jensen, 1983; Letza, Sun, & Kirkbride, 2004) identiﬁes the control
function as the board’s principal activity, and assumes that non-
executive board members are more effective than executive board
members in controlling the senior management and protecting
shareholder interests. This perspective reinforces the particular
importance of the role of non-executive directors in board com-
position. To this can be added the recent ﬁnancial scandals of
high-proﬁle ﬁrms (Enron, Tyco, WorldCom, Adelphia), which have
reminded us of the importance of board independence, while bring-
ing about a reduction in the number of executive board members
and giving primacy to the board’s control function. Recent studies
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Lynall, Golden, & Hillman, 2003; Stiles
& Taylor, 2001) consider that new functions should be included,
such as service, or resource provision, this latter being at the
heart of our investigation. These new functions are founded on
the use of knowledge, information, experience, capabilities, etc.,
namely, the set of resources that each board member brings to the
board. This new viewpoint affects studies of board composition
by altering the initial perspective: board composition should not
only be viewed in quantitative terms (percentage of non-executive
directors), but also in qualitative terms, since every board mem-
ber, regardless of type, contributes complementary resources to
the ﬁrm, which are required by the group as a whole for effective
decision-making (Certo, 2003; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Westphal
& Fredrickson, 2001).
The resource dependency theory considers that the board of
directors is an effective mechanism for the ﬁrm, in that its mem-
bers have outside contacts or external links with the environment
(Kim, 2005). Of all the external connections, the relations that have
been studied most frequently by researchers are the ties to other
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rms through shared board members (interlocking directorates)
Beckman & Haunschild, 2002; Gulati et al., 2000; Hillman & Dalziel,
003; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998; Ortiz
t al., 2012).
nterlocks and their effect on ﬁrm performance
The experience that directors acquire by serving on other
oards (interlocks) is a valuable resource that enables them
o fulﬁl their roles more effectively because of their ability to
pply their external experiences (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Kor &
undaramurthy, 2009; Tian et al., 2011). Boards with a high number
f external connections will beneﬁt from rapid access to important
xternal information and critical resources (Kor & Sundaramurthy,
009). Prior studies have shown that these external connections
lay an important role in the transfer of knowledge and success-
ul practices between ﬁrms (Burt & Carlton, 1989; Shipilov et al.,
010). Firms might also beneﬁt from their directors’ ties, gaining
upport from external stakeholders and other inﬂuential agents,
hich could be critical for the organisation’s performance (Hillman,
annella, & Paetzold, 2000; Kiel & Nicholson, 2006). Finally, the
egitimacy of the decisions taken by these ﬁrms will also increase
hen their directors also serve on the boards of other compa-
ies (Mizruchi & Stearns, 1988, 1994; Westphal, Seidel, & Stewart,
001).
However, despite these beneﬁts, some authors believe that
here are also risks or dangers associated with interlocks (Fligstein,
995; Palmer, Barber, & Xueguang, 1995). Prior studies have
rgued that serving on a number of boards limits the time and atten-
ion that directors can dedicate to each one and reduces the degree
f internal cohesion within the board. As a result, they suggest that
hen board members have a high number of interlocks it could
e damaging to the ﬁrm’s performance (Kor & Sundaramurthy,
009). Therefore, while a moderate number of external links can
elp to improve ﬁrm performance, it is reasonable to suggest that
bove a certain level, this positive inﬂuence could become negative,
reating a curvilinear relation (inverted-U) between the number of
oard interlocks and the ﬁrm’s results.
Finally, as we indicate in the introduction, the majority of
nvestigations into the relation between interlocks and ﬁrm per-
ormance have only studied the links brought by non-executive
irectors. However, it is important to consider the resources
hat executive directors contribute through their own external con-
ections. These directors also provide access to resources and key
nformation on how other board’s function, which can be directly
pplied to the ﬁrm’s decision-making processes. Furthermore,
xternal ties have been linked to the good reputation of board mem-
ers which, in the case of executive directors, improves investors’
erceptions of the ﬁrm’s decision-makers (Bjornali & Gulbrandsen,
010; Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Johnson, Schnatterly,
olton, & Tuggle 2011; Kim & Cannella, 2008; Shropshire, 2010;
incent et al., 2009). Experience obtained from other ﬁrms via
 tie created by an executive director could be applied directly
o the focal ﬁrm’s decision-making, with no need for any kind
f intermediary, and is likely to increase the transfer of knowl-
dge and successful practices between ﬁrms. The risks associated
ith an excessive number of external connections, such as the
ack of time and attention paid to the focal ﬁrm, would also be
educed/minimised since executive directors are fully aware of the
rm’s operations because of their own involvement with the man-
gement of the ﬁrm.Therefore, in view of these arguments, we propose the
ollowing:
H1. There is a curvilinear (inverted-U) relation between (non-
executive and executive) directors’ membership of multiple boards Dirección y Economía de la Empresa 24 (2015) 130–137
(interlocks) and ﬁrm performance, such that performance will
improve as the total number of interlocks rises, but then falls as
the total number of interlocks increases.
Following another line of study, Adler and Kwon (2002) sug-
gest that the behaviour of a group, such as a board of directors,
is inﬂuenced by its external ties, and also by its ability to work
towards common objectives. These authors make the point that
these two board member relations – external and internal ties –
are not mutually exclusive. Taking these arguments, we propose
that boards with a high number of external ties also require a high
level of shared knowledge and familiarity between the directors, in
order to facilitate their internal relations and to mitigate the pos-
sible negative effects of boards with a high number of interlocks.
With Kor and Sundaramurthy (2009), we  argue that experience on
a particular board gives directors the opportunity to become more
familiar with the capabilities, habits and personalities of their fel-
low board members, breaking down barriers between them and
allowing them to share and apply the resources gained from these
external ties. We  therefore propose that board tenure, which refers
to the degree of familiarity and knowledge sharing between board
members during the period that they serve together on the board,
moderates the relation between a high number of interlocks and
ﬁrm performance.
We  therefore propose the following working hypothesis:
H2. Average board tenure moderates the relation (inverted-U)
between directors’ membership of multiple boards and ﬁrm per-
formance. Speciﬁcally, when average board tenure is high, the
percentage decrease in ﬁrm performance (associated with an
increase in the number of external ties) is reduced.
Methodology
Sample and data collection
The sample of ﬁrms used in this study comprises Spanish ﬁrms
quoted on the Madrid Stock Exchange and the Continuous Market
during the period 2005–2008. These ﬁrms were chosen because of
their obligation to publish data relating to their corporate gover-
nance and performance. We  subsequently eliminated the following
ﬁrms: (1) those classiﬁed as ﬁnancial services (if they included
estate agencies), given the difﬁculty involved in interpreting all of
the data relating to that sector; (2) ﬁrms that ceased to be quoted
during the period of analysis (we only included ﬁrms that were
quoted on the stock exchange for the entire study period); and (3)
ﬁrms for which we did not have access to their annual reports.
Within these limitations, we obtained a total of 94 ﬁrms, but from
this total we had to eliminate another six ﬁrms that did not provide
data on their directors’ interlocks, leaving a ﬁnal sample of 88 ﬁrms.
The data on the ﬁrms’ results were obtained from the DataS-
tream database and information on board composition was
obtained from the Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores
(CNMV, the Spanish Stock Market Commission); from their reports
we were able to access the names of all the board members for
each ﬁrm in our sample – a total of 3482 directors for the period
2005–2008.
To obtain information relating to each director’s interlocks, we
turned to Axesor,  a consultancy ﬁrm specialising in the provision of
information on ﬁrms and directors, obtained from ofﬁcial registers.
The information from Axesor,  available in the Ofﬁcial Mercantile
Registry Bulletin (BORME), provided a list of the ties that each direc-
tor has with one or more boards, in both quoted and unquoted ﬁrms,
for each year of the study. To achieve this, we used the start and end
dates corresponding to the interlock of each board member. Within
these guidelines, the total number of external ties was  14,972.
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The information on our control variables was  obtained from a
umber of sources, depending on whether the variable was  linked
o the ﬁrm or the board. At the ﬁrm level, the information on ﬁrm
ize and age was obtained from the Osiris database and the stock
xchange sectoral classiﬁcation published by CNMV. Information
t board level regarding the number of directors on each board,
EO/Chair duality and the type of directors on each board was
btained from the corporate governance reports published by the
NMV.
ependent variable
We  used return on assets (ROA) as our measurement of ﬁnancial
erformance for each ﬁrm. We  calculated the ROA (with a one-year
ag, ROA+1) as the proﬁt derived from the company’s operations
ivided by the ﬁrm’s total assets for each year. In general, we con-
ider that countable measures such as ROA reﬂect the inﬂuence
f the internal management more accurately than market-based
easures, which are more susceptible to the inﬂuence of exoge-
ous economic factors (Elitzur & Yaari, 1995; He & Huang, 2011).
ndependent and moderator variables
Board tenure is calculated as the average number of years that
oard members have served on a particular board (Golden & Zajac,
001; Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Kaymak & Bektas, 2008;
or & Sundaramurthy, 2009; McIntyre, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2007).
We deﬁne interlocks as the ties that are formed when a board
ember serves on the board of another ﬁrm. This measure of
nterlocks has previously been used in the literature on boards
Filatotchev, 2006; Haynes & Hillman, 2010; Kor & Sundaramurthy,
009; Wincent et al., 2009; Ortiz et al., 2012; Pombo & Gutiérrez,
011; Tian et al., 2011). Non-executive directors’ interlocks are cal-
ulated as the total number of external ties with other ﬁrms that are
ormed by a board’s non-executive directors. The total number of
nterlocks is calculated as the total number of external ties formed
y both executive and non-executive directors with other ﬁrms.
Taking the lead from other studies on corporate governance,
e have included the following control variables that might affect
he proposed relations: CEO/Chair duality (Ellstrand, Tihanyi, &
ohnson, 2002; Holm & Schuler, 2010; Singla, George, & Eliyaht,
010), measured as a dummy  variable with the value 1 when the
hief executive of a ﬁrm is also Chair of the board and 0 other-
ise; board size (Kim, 2005, 2007; Kroll, Walter, & Wright, 2008;
casio, 1994; Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed,
007), measured as the number of directors on the board; ﬁrm
ge (Barroso, Villegas, & Pérez-Calero, 2011; Calof, 1993; Zahra
t al., 2007), measured as the number of years since the ﬁrm was
ounded; percentage of non-executive directors (Datta, Musteen,
 Herrmann, 2009; Filatotchev, Dynomina, Wright, & Buck, 2001;
ingla et al., 2010), calculated as the sum of non-executive direc-
ors on each board divided by the total number of board members;
rm size, measured by the number of employees in each ﬁrm for
ach year; and the ﬁrm’s previous performance, measured by pre-
ious return on assets (ROA) (Kim, 2005; Tian et al., 2011). Finally,
o control for temporal and sectoral effects, we  included dummy
ariables for each year (2005–2008) and industry, according to the
tock market industry classiﬁcation published by the CNMV.1
1 We have used the information from the database relating to the stock mar-
et  industry classiﬁcations proposed by CNMV, coded as follows: (1) petroleum
nd  energy; (2) raw materials, industry and construction; (3) consumer goods; (4)
onsumer services; (5) ﬁnancial and property services; and (6) technology and com-
unications. Given the differences in the frequency of the observations for each Ta
b
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Table  2
Results of the analysis of non-executive directors’ interlocks versus total interlocks and ﬁrm performance.
Model 1 “baseline model
with control variables”
Model 2 “non-executive
directors’ interlocks”
Model 3 “total
interlocks”
Non-executive directors’ interlocks 1.18
Non-executive directors’ interlocks2 −1.20
Total interlocks 2.78***
Total interlocks2 −2.39**
ROAt−1 1.62 1.54 1.70*
CEO/Chair duality 0.38 0.36 0.76
Board  size 1.31 1.19 −0.10
Firm  age −2.96*** −2.64*** −2.87***
% of non-executive directors 0.51 0.46 0.83
Log  ﬁrm size −1.08 −1.16 −1.48*
Industry effect YES YES YES
Annual effect YES YES YES
Z1 11.32* 9.52 14.46*
Z2 28.47*** 28.14*** 30.68***
m2 0.72 0.70 0.90
Hansen 6.12 5.23 4.27
X2 32.87*** 33.85*** 36.35***
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i* p < .10.
** p < .05.
*** p < .01.
tatistical estimations
To test our hypotheses we used an estimation process that
s appropriate for our theoretical arguments and robust enough
o withstand the typical problems associated with panel data
nalysis. We therefore used the Arellano–Bond model and used
he generalised methods of moments (GMM)  method (Arellano &
ond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Greene, 2003). These authors
ropose the use of GMM,  using the lagged values of the origi-
al independent variables as instruments, thereby resolving the
roblem of endogeneity. Hermalin and Weisbach (2000) and
guilera and Cuervo-Cazurra (2009) argue that endogeneity makes
t hard to analyse relations between board composition and ﬁrm
alue, and so if this is not controlled, the results could generate
rrors and inconsistent estimations. In this work, potential endo-
eneity could be due to the problem of simultaneity or inverse
ausality (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003) and therefore, in accor-
ance with prior studies, we have included the percentage of
on-executive directors within the total number of board mem-
ers as sources of endogeneity (Andrés de, Valentín, & Félix, 2005;
ackling & Johl, 2009; Kim, 2007; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009;
ombo & Gutiérrez, 2011). We  used the Stata/SE software pro-
ramme  to calculate all of our estimations.
We  also considered the possible problems of heteroscedasticity
nd autocorrelation. In order to establish if there was  a problem
f heteroscedasticity we carried out a modiﬁed Wald test, which
ejected the H0 absence of heteroscedasticity, and we therefore
elected the robust option in Stata for all of our models. To control
or autocorrelation, we ran the Wooldridge test, using the xtserial
ommand in Stata. The H0 absence of correlations was  rejected, and
he test therefore indicated that there was a problem of autocorre-
ation to be corrected.
We consider our model to be “autoregressive” and have there-
ore included the lagged dependent variable (ROAt−1) as the
nstrument, but the lagged dependent variable was  intrinsically
orrelated to the non-observed effects at panel level, giving incon-
istent standard estimators for the linear regression models for the
andom and ﬁxed effects. This supports our use of the GMM  method
Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; Greene, 2003).
ector, we have assigned “1” to industries 1, 4, 5 and 6; “2” to industry 2; and “3” to
ndustry 3.To test the validity of the model speciﬁcation when using GMM,
the Hansen Statistic of overidentifying restrictions was applied
to evaluate the lack of correlation between the instruments and
the terminal error in all of our models. The acceptance of the H0
Hansen statistic implies the absence of any correlation between
the instruments used and the terminal error in all of our models.
We also included the m2 statistic, which enabled us to conﬁrm the
absence of any secondary-order serial correlation in the regression
residuals. Further to these comparative speciﬁcation tests, we
included the following Wald tests in the estimations: ﬁrst (z1) joint
signiﬁcance of the reported coefﬁcients of the explanatory variables
and second (z2) joint signiﬁcance of the dummy  time variables. Both
were statistically signiﬁcant.
Table 1 sets out the descriptive statistics and the correla-
tion matrix for the variables. The variables used in the model
were not strongly correlated either between themselves or with
the control variables, and there were therefore no problems of
multicollinearity. In order to avoid the possible problems
of multicollinearity between the primary effects and interaction
terms, the independent variables were centred before the interac-
tion variables were created (Aiken & West, 1991).
Results
The results obtained are set out below (Tables 2 and 3). Model 1
is the base model that includes all of the control variables. Curiously,
none of the variables, with the exception of ﬁrm size, are signiﬁcant.
As can be observed, our results conﬁrm our two proposed work-
ing hypotheses. With regard to hypothesis 1, models 2 and 3
conﬁrm that the inverted-U relation between interlocks and ﬁrm
performance is only signiﬁcant when we include the total num-
ber of interlocks rather than the number of ties belonging only
to the non-executive directors. In model 3, the estimated coefﬁ-
cient for the total number of interlocks was statistically signiﬁcant
(p < .01) with a positive value, while the total number of interlocks
was statistically signiﬁcant (p < .05) with a negative value.
Model 4 includes the moderating variable, board tenure. The
table shows that the board tenure coefﬁcient is statistically sig-
niﬁcant (p < .01), with a positive value. The squared term of the
interlocks was  negative and signiﬁcant (p < .01). The linear interac-
tion term for tenure and the interlocks was  negative and signiﬁcant
(p < .01), and the squared interaction term (p < .01) was positive and
signiﬁcant.
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Table  3
Results of the moderating effect of average board tenure on the relationship between
total interlocks and ﬁrm performance.
Model 4
Board tenure 2.94***
Total interlocks 3.41***
Total interlocks2 −3.12***
Total interlocks*board tenure −2.95***
Total interlocks2*board tenure 2.95***
ROAt−1 1.70*
CEO/chair duality 0.70
Board size 0.43
Firm age −4.14***
% of non-executive directors 0.71
Log ﬁrm size −1.61
Industry effect YES
Annual effect YES
Z1 24.29***
Z2 24.48***
m2 0.94
Hansen 6.12
X2 41.76***
* p < .10.
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Therefore, in relation to hypothesis 2, we  can conﬁrm the
oderating effect of board tenure on the negative relation between
 high total number of interlocks and ﬁrm performance. However,
nd although it was not predicted in our hypothesis, this mod-
rator effect also exists in the positive relation between a small
otal number of interlocks and ﬁrm performance. In comparison
o model 3, adjusted model 4 is fairly signiﬁcant, producing an
ncrease in the value of X2, which suggests that board tenure mode-
ates the curvilinear effects of the total number of interlocks on
erformance.
onclusions
Unlike agency theory, which argues that a high percentage of
on-executive directors is required to fulﬁl the board’s control
unction, more recent theories have focused on the search for
ualiﬁed and competent directors, regardless of type. However,
ith regard to interlocks, the majority of authors have concentrated
xclusively on the study of the non-executive directors’ ties (Kim,
007; Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Tian et al., 2011) to compensate
or the executive directors’ lack of business experience or external
ontacts (Filatotchev, 2006). On the other hand, from the resource
ependency perspective, with its focus on the capture of resources
or the ﬁrm (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), the essential aspects have
een board size – if the number of board members rises, the oppor-
unity to capture external resources also increases – and diversity
ithin the board, since more diverse boards have access to a
roader range of resources. Logically, these two  variables also affect
oard composition. Our study demonstrates that another variable
 less explored and of greater interest for explaining the inﬂuence
f the board on a ﬁrm’s results – is the consideration of the board
s a single entity, which does not take account of board member
ype when analyzing their potential for establishing external links.
n fact, the results obtained in our investigation (a comparison of
odels 2 and 3) demonstrate the need to view the board as a single
ntity.
Our models 3 and 4 also support our predictions. If a board
ishes to be more efﬁcient, it should increase the number of
nterlocks. However, increasing the number of these ties could
lso have a negative effect on the board’s internal functioning, as
he group’s cohesion might be reduced when board members are
orced to divide their energies and attention between too many Dirección y Economía de la Empresa 24 (2015) 130–137 135
responsibilities. The board will therefore achieve its greatest pro-
ductive efﬁciency when it has not only access to the greatest
possible number of resources but is also able to function as
a compact social group when taking decisions. We  argue that
internal relations, through board tenure, moderate the negative
effects caused by a high number of board interlocks, and high-
light the need to view the board as a decision-making body.
Furthermore, although it was not predicted in our hypotheses,
the results also show that board tenure moderates the positive
relation between a low number of external links and ﬁrm per-
formance. Directors with an appropriate/non-excessive number
of ties and who therefore have more time to dedicate to their
own board will be negatively inﬂuenced by a long tenure with
the ﬁrm. A possible explanation that has not previously been con-
sidered is that if the two  elements are combined (a lot of time
to dedicate to the board and long tenure), directors could be
affected by their own  beliefs and the schemes that have been devel-
oped within their ﬁrm, and therefore the resources acquired in
other ﬁrms could become a less valuable resource. That is to say,
the board members could start to be more affected by a set of
behaviour patterns learned in their own ﬁrm than by the knowl-
edge that they acquire from the ﬁrms on whose boards they serve.
Executive directors will only be able to take decisions that are
deﬁned by these patterns and the abilities of non-executive direc-
tors to provide resources and offer advice to the management team
will be reduced.
In the majority of cases, the difﬁcult balance between board
independence and the board’s social capital (via interlocks) can
vary, depending on the context and type of ﬁrm, which suggests
that future investigations should focus on these aspects. For exam-
ple, ﬁrms operating in dynamic markets, or which face an initial
public offering (IPO), should pay particular attention to their human
and social capital requirements in relation to the strict indepen-
dence of their non-executive directors (Filatotchev, 2006; Kor &
Sundaramurthy, 2009). Other possible future lines of investiga-
tion could look in greater detail at the nature of interlocks. In
this study, we have only considered national interlocks, between
Spanish ﬁrms. It would be of interest to see whether the effects
on performance of interlocks with foreign ﬁrms differ from those
identiﬁed in this study, or even how this would affect the other
dependent variables, such as the ﬁrm’s internationalisation. Entry
into new markets, or setting up subsidiaries in international mar-
kets, brings signiﬁcant beneﬁts for the ﬁrm’s growth. These also
tend to be complex operations, given the high levels of uncer-
tainty and risk of failure associated with them (Sanders & Carpenter,
1998). In this context, interlocks constitute a very important
tool that gives board members the opportunity to access infor-
mation that mitigates risks and allows them to seek information
from other ﬁrms. Finally, we would point out that this work does
not specify whether the interlocks are “intragroup” – ties between
ﬁrms belonging to a particular group, with shared ownership or
even overlapping activities – or are interlocks between ﬁrms that
are completely independent of each other with regard to their
ownership structure. This distinction might affect our results.
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